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Chapter 11
Social Security and Employer
Induced Retirement
Robert M. Hutchens

Northrop Grumman ... recently offered early retirement incentives to long time
employees like me. So I took them up on it and enjoyed all ofJanuary off. Never
having had that much time to myself since High School (College vacations spent in
an aeroplane factory) I really enjoyed it and recommend it to anyone else with that
option. [My wife] is still too young however, so I am back as a contract employee for
another 6 months and hoping to get them to let me work part time, the ideal
situation. (http://www.ddg.com/nemesis/95.MAR.html)

Employers play an important role in the retirement behavior of older workers. When business deteriorates and workforce reductions are requisite,
employers like Northrop Grumman often ask older workers to lead the
exodus. More broadly, in setting wage levels and pension parameters, employers can influence a worker's attitude toward retirement. Since changes
in social security policy can similarly affect attitudes toward retirement, one
would think that changes in social security policy could influence employer
behavior toward older workers. This chapter uses a simulation model to explore poten tial links between the social security program and employer
efforts at encouraging workers to retire. The simulations are built on an implicit contract theory of unemployment insurance (Hutchens 1995, 1996).
In essence I treat social security as a special form of unemployment insurance limited to people age 62 and older, one that is financed out of taxes
with no experience rating.
A large economic literature argues that such a system will affect the way in
which employers respond to periods of slack demand. l In a manner consistent with that literature, I first describe a simulation framework that allows a
conventional unemployment insurance system to affect employers' propensity to initiate separations. Next 1 introduce a type of social security system
into the model, and examine how separation probabilities change by age.
Additional simulations show how changes in the parameters of the social
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security system affect behavior. At the outset it is important to be clear about
the limitations of this exercise. The simulations do not constitute empirical
evidence, but are instead best viewed as rough estimates of the potential
magnitude of anticipated economic effects. Also, the analysis is built on a
simplified version of the social security system. As such, the results remain
suggestive; they cannot be viewed as hard data in support of policy.

Theoretical Framework
This section introduces an implicit contract model of how government
transfers influence employer behavior. We first sketch an implicit contract
model of unemployment insurance and temporary layoffs, and then discuss
links between social security and employer initiated separations. 2
Consider an economy with many firms and homogeneous workers. Workers obtain income for consumption by entering into a one-period contract
with a firm. Workers are assumed to be risk averse, so they seek contracts
that minimize income fluctuations. When employed, each worker earns
wage wand obtains utility U (w( 1- t) ), where t is a payroll tax. 3 When not
employed, the worker obtains utility U(c + b + z), where c is government
unemployment insurance, b is a private payment from the firm, and z is the
consumption value ofleisure and home production. Letting p represent the
probability that the worker is employed, the worker's expected utility under
the contract is:
EU = PU(w(1-t)) + (1-P)U(c+ b+z).

For simplicity, the model assumes each firm employs a single worker.
Firms compete for workers by offering contracts that maximize profit while
economizing on income risk to workers. For a contract to be acceptable to
workers, expected utility under the contract must be greater than or equal
to that available in alternative jobs and activities. Letting EU* represent this
alternative expected utility, we have:
(1)

EU

2:

EU.*

Firms also pay taxes. Like the workers, firms are assumed to pay a payroll
equal to t. As developed below, the payroll tax can be used to finance
social security. In addition, the firms pay taxes to finance unemployment
insurance. Since unemployment insurance benefits are experience rated,
the cost to the firm of providing unemployment insurance cis ec, where e is
an experience rating tax rate with a :5 e:51. When eis less than one, the firm
does not bear the full cost of the government-provided unemployment insurance, and experience rating is imperfect. In this case the subsidy per
worker is (1 - e) c.
At the time the contract is negotiated, the employer is uncertain about
tax
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the future state of product demand and thereby the worker's marginal
product, a. The value of a is only revealed after the contract is signed, but
before work begins. When it is revealed, we assume it becomes public knowledge. (There is no asymmetric information in this model.) Assume that a is
distributed!(a). As such, given the realized value of a, the contract specifies
w(a), b(a), and p(a).
An employer's expected profit when negotiating the contract can then be
written:
(2)

II

=

T{(e -

w(e)(l + t»p(e) - (b(e) + ec)(l- p(e»}!(e)de.

-00

In other words, for a realized value of a, the firm's profit is the sum of (i)
the marginal product (a) minus wage costs (w( a) (I +t» multiplied by the
probability of employment p(a), and (ii) the private payments to nonworkers (b(a» and the cost of unemployment insurance (ec) multiplied by
the probability of nonemployment (l-p(a». Expected profit is the expected value of this sum (i plus ii) over all feasible values of a. Given the
profit function, the firm's problem is to offer a contract that maximizes the
present value of expected profit (0) subject to two constraints: p(a) lies
between zero and one, and expected utility under the contract is no less
than that in jobs elsewhere in the market (EU*). 4 We write this problem as
max II subject to EU = EU

* and 0 ~ p(()

~

1.

wIO),bIO),PIO)

This problem is easily analyzed when the payroll tax tis zero. 5 In this case,
the resulting contract has two key features. First, the firm provides complete
insurance. Wages paid to the employed and private payments to the nonemployed are set so that marginal utilities are the same for all realized values
of a. Given the assumed utility function, and letting an asterisk denote
optimal levels, this implies that for all values of a:
(3)

w*= b*+ c+ z.

Second, the employment probability,
rule:

p* (a), follows the following simple

z+ (l-e)cthenp*(()

If()

2:

If()

< z+ (l-e)cthenp*(() =0.

=

1,

(4)

In other words, the worker is employed (and receives wage w*) if the revealed value of a is greater than or equal to the value of" externally financed
consumption" (z + (l-e)c). Otherwise, the worker is not employed and
receives b* from the firm and cfrom the government.
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In this simple world without asymmetric information, workers are indifferent between employment and nonemployment. The contract insures
that they have the same utility regardless of their work status. Moreover, an
increase in government unemployment insurance (c) results in a dollar for
dollar reduction in private payments to nonworkers (IF). The firm makes
these private payments in order to protect workers from income fluctuations. When the government provides this protection, then the firm cuts
back, paying an experience rated tax of e for each dollar of government
benefits.
One interesting result of equation 4 is that neither wages nor private
payments enter into the employment decision. That is a fundamental difference between this model and a labor supply model. Wages and private
payments (such as pensions) are endogenous transfer payments that have
nothing to do with the employment decision. Employment is strictly a function of the worker's marginal product and externally financed consumption. Also, given equation 4, the probability that the worker is employed
depends on both his realized marginal product and the level of externally
financed consumption. Specifically, a higher government subsidy to nonemployment (a higher level of (I-e) c) results in more nonemployment.
Consequently, when experience rating is complete (e = 1) and the subsidy is
zero, the worker is employed if and only if the realized marginal product in
the firm exceeds the consumption value of home production z.
The model becomes more complex with positive payroll taxes. We assume
the payroll tax is shared between employer and employee, but it is not levied
on private payments to the nonemployed. Hence, an increase in" t" has two
effects. First, it raises employer wage costs, and thereby creates incentives to
shift compensation away from earnings and toward those private payments.
Second, the tax reduces a worker's utility when employed relative to utility
when not employed. Both effects reduce the probability of employment. 6
Now, what does this have to do with social security and older workers? We
know that companies do make payments to nonemployed older workers in
the form of pensions, early retirement window plans, and severance pay.
Moreover, these payments are often made with an eye toward available government benefits; pensions are typically integrated with social security so
that private benefits fall when a person becomes eligible for government
benefits (see Gregory, this volume). That behavior is thoroughly consistent
with the model.
The model also implies that social security should affect separations in a
manner similar to unemployment insurance. We have strong evidence that
imperfectly experience rated unemployment insurance increases the likelihood of temporary layoffs during periods of slack demand. Since social
security benefits are not experience rated, they could similarly increase
the likelihood of employer induced retirements during periods of slack
demand.?
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Evidence
This section provides partial support for the model just described. Specifically, we show that the U.S. social security program is used as a form of
unemployment insurance, and that employer behavior is influenced by government assistance to older workers.

Unemployment Insurance Receipt atAge 62
One way to test the structure just described is to examine whether unemployment insurance receipt increases around the time that workers become
eligible for social security benefits. In order to preserve worker utility in an
implicit contract setting, the firm must compensate laid off workers. Unemployment insurance is likely to be a part of that compensation, especially
when UI experience rating is imperfect. If social security tends to increase
employer induced separations, then we should also observe an increase in
. unemployment insurance receipt around the time that workers become
eligible for old age benefits. At that time, employers essentially compensate
separated workers with a combination of social security, unemployment
insurance, and, perhaps, pension benefits.
Hutchens (1996) used 1975 Current Population Survey data to show that
the probability of UI receipt increased sharply around age 62, particularly
for the lower skilled employee. In 1975 most workers in the U.S. could
simultaneously receive both unemployment insurance and social security
benefits. This evidence then suggests that social security does, in fact, increase employer induced separations.

Employer Behavior and Expansions of Government Assistance to
Older Workers
Turning to international evidence, we find at least two cases where the
payment of government transfers to older workers caused employers to
reduce older workers' employment. One was the Austrian extension of unemployment benefit duration in 1988, and the second was the West German
"5ger" plan.
The Austrian case, documented in Winter-Ebmer (1996), arose from the
1998 extension of the duration of unemployment insurance benefits from
52 to 209 weeks. This extension only applied to workers over age 50 who
lived in specific counties ofAustria. Moreover, to be eligible, a worker had to
be involuntarily unemployed: that is, the unemployment had to arise from a
layoff and not be the result of a quit or a misconduct discharge. Comparing
older affected workers with a "control group" consisting of both younger
workers and older workers in non-selected counties, Winter-Ebmer demonstrates that this policy change not only increased the duration of unemploy-
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ment receipt for older workers in the selected counties, but also increased
the incidence of unemployment insurance receipt. Specifically, older workers
eligible for the extended benefits entered the unemployment insurance
program at a rate 11 percentage points higher than the controls. From the
perspective of the above theory, what is particularly interesting is that the
government transfers flowed to the workers, not the employers, yet it was
the employers who changed behavior.
A similar phenomenon occurred in the West German "5ger" program.
Under this program, when an employer's economic prospects were sufficiently bleak, the West German government permitted workers to receive
government supplied early retirement benefits (unemployment insurance
and public pensions) at age 59, and more recently, at age 57. Workers could
not simply apply for the benefits; rather, their employers had to seek coverage under the program and then designate specific workers for early retirement. And that is exactly what happened. Although the benefits flowed to
the workers, case studies indicate that employers often used the program to
shed older employees (Naschold et al. 1994; Casey 1989).

Some U.S. Workers Seem to Use Social Security as a Form of
Unemployment Insurance
Additional evidence is offered by Rust (1990), who examines the lag between the age at which workers apply for benefits and the age at which they
first receive OASI payments for six months or more. He finds a two-year
delay among the set of applicants tl1at eventually received OASI payments.
Rust then goes on to say that
the majority of workers who apply for benefits at age 62 and continue working are
either low-wage / income workers whose total annual earnings at ages after 62 are not
significan tly higher than the earnings test level or are a smaller group of workers who
apparently initially intended to quit working at age 62 but experienced adverse
financial problems or encountered a particularly attractive job opportunity that
prompted them to return to work. (1970: 374)
From the perspective of the above theoretical framework, one would like to
know how often these workers returned to work with their pre-application
employer. Unfortunately, Rust does not address that question.
Evidence from several other countries also indicates that social security
recipiency rates trace a pattern similar to unemployment insurance over the
business cycle. Specifically, old age program recipiency rates increase during recessions and decrease during expansions (Rebick 1994).
Although the latter results on the business cycle as well as Rust's findings
might be explained with a standard labor supply analysis (whereby workers
choose their hours of work in order to maximize personal utility), the first
two elements of evidence do not fit easily into that framework. Rather, the
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evidence suggests that employers are actively involved in retirement decisions, a conclusion consistent with the implicit contract explanation discussed above.

Setting Up the Simulations
One might question whether the economic incentives inherent in the U.S.
social security program are strong enough actually to induce workers and
firms to use social security as a form of unemployment insurance. Moreover,
one would like to know whether policy changes could have important behavioral effects. Simulation provides a useful tool for exploring such issues.
This section expands the previous model in order to simulate the effects of a
structure similar to the U.S. social security program. The simulations begin
with a model of the unemployment insurance system that yields ~ incidence of layoffs that is consistent with that empirical evidence. The social
security program is then introduced into the model, with social security
treated as a form of unemployment insurance available after age 62. The
simulations then indicate how the introduction of this social security plan
affects the incidence of employer-initiated separations. Given that, one
can go on to examine how changes in the social security program affect
behavior.
This section begins with a description of the model used in the simulations. It then discusses how social security is parameterized, a discussion that
includes a necessary but lengthy examination of actuarial adjustments. The
section closes with a description of other parameters used in the simulations, as well as the initial "benchmark" runs.

The Model
To generalize our earlier discussion, we assume that workers live for several
periods and thus enter into multiperiod contracts with a single firm. There
is no mobility between firms in this model once the contract is signed; the
worker either is employed by the contracting firm or spends time in "nonemployment." To keep things relatively simple, all of the workers are assumed to reach their 65th birthday on January 1,1995. To simplify survival
rates, we also assume that all the workers in this cohort are males (obviously,
similar simulations could be performed for women), and all financial variables abstract from inflation.
As before, workers are either employed or not employed, and they evaluate well-being with the utility function U (e) (where U' > 0, U" < 0). In
the multiperiod case expected utility in period} is specified as EU} =
P/w)l- t)) + (I-Pj) U (bj+~+zj)' where
Pj is the probability that the worker is employed in period j,
wj is the worker's wage in period j,
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t is the payroll tax,
bj is the private payment from the firm to the worker in period j,
{5j is either social security or unemployment insurance, and
Zj is the consumption value ofleisure and home production in period j.
To simplify the exposition, we assume that a period lasts for one year and
that period j is synonymous with age j. Workers live for a maximum of]
periods (or years). On their 25th birthday they enter into employment
contracts that stretch from that day until death. Mobility costs are such that
once workers have accepted the contract, they remain with the firm until
retirement. In consequence, viable contracts must yield lifetime utility that
equals or exceeds that in alternative jobs and activities. We write this constraintas
J

(6)

I

}=1

where X-j is the fraction of the birth cohort surviving to age j given that they
have survived to age 25 (since no one lives past], X-J = 0),
(3 is the worker's discount rate, and
EU* is the expected utility in alternative jobs and activities.
Government transfer payments in period j({5j) take the form of either
unemployment insurance or social security benefits. Unemployment insurance benefits (denoted c) can be received in all periods of the contract.
Social security benefits (denoted v) can be received only after age 62. For
the present analysis, social security benefits are set at the same value (v o) for
all people over 62 and are only available to nonworkers. Actuarial adjustments and rules governing simultaneous receipt of social security and unemployment insurance are dealt with below. Thus, {5j = c + Vj' where vj =0 for j
= 25-61, and v j =v o for j = 62-j. Government taxes are as before. Unemployment insurance benefits are in part financed through experience rating; the
cost to the firm of an unemployment insurance benefit cis ec, where e is an
"experience rating" tax rate, with 0 ::5 e::5 1. The firm and the worker also
each pay a payroll tax t on wage income. 8
Once again the firm's goal is to maximize profits over the length of the
contract. The firm's technology is, however, somewhat different. A worker
with skill level S has two possible marginal products: S a(H) or S a(L), with
a(H) >a (LF==O. Let aj represent the state of demand for the firm's product
in period j. At the time the worker and firm en ter in to the contract, they are
uncertain about both the worker's skill level and future values of aj • Let the
probability that aj = a(H) be q/a(H» and the probability that aj = a(L) be
q/a(L» = 1- q/a(H». The state of demand (aj ) is revealed at the beginning of period j, at which point it becomes public knowledge.
With regard to skill level, assume that the worker and firm only know the
expected value of the worker's skill level at the time that the contract is
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negotiated. The actual value of S is drawn from the distribution f(S) in the
first year of the contract, and remains at that level until age 70. One could
think of S as similar to an index of the quality of the worker-finn match.
Although outsiders cannot observe it, and neither the worker nor the firm
knows its value when the contract is signed, match quality affects the worker's productivity in the firm. In order to simplifY the simulations, we assume
that worker's skill drops to zero after age 70 as does marginal product within
the firm. While the firm maintains its contractual commitment to pay pensions to workers after age 70, it no longer employs these workers. 9
Let w(6j ), b(6j ), P(6j ) represent the value of the wage, the private payment, and the employment probability respectively for the two possible
values of 6j in year j = 25,]. Then the firm's expected profit in year j from a
worker with skill Swho has survived to year j can be written:
B(H)

(7)

TI j =

2:

q(S){(SSj - w(S)P(S) - (b(S) + ec) (l - P(S;»}.

Bj=B(L)'

.

As before, the firm's problem is to offer a contract that maximizes the
present value of expected profit subject to two constraints: P(6) lies between zero and one, and expected utility under the contract is no less than
that in jobs elsewhere in the market (EU*). Now, however, the contract must
be written over the J years of the worker's potential lifetime. The discount
rate (13) used by the firm is assumed to be the same as that used by the
worker. Thus, the optimal contract sets w(6j ), b( 0) ,P(O),j = 25- 69, and bi'
j = 60-Jso as to solve the problem,

subject to
J

2:

AjW-25EUj = EU

* and 0 ~ P( 6)

~ l.

j=2!l

Although this looks daunting, it has essentially the same solution as the
simpler model above. Once again, when t = 0 the firm provides complete
insurance against income fluctuations, implying,
w;* = b;* + gi + Zi = w/ = b/ + f5; + Zj' for i, j = 25,],

where * denotes optimal levels. Thus, as above, consumption when employed (Uj*) equals consumption when not employed (b/ + & + ~). In this
model, however, the equality holds both within and across all periods of the
contract.
The probability of employment in this model is also quite similar to that
developed previously. When t = 0, a worker is employed if the worker's
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marginal product (S 8) exceeds that worker's "externally financed consumption" when not employed (v j + (I-e) c + Zj). As payroll taxes are raised,
employment falls (because the marginal product is less likely to exceed vj +
(1- e) C + Zj + 2wj *dt).
Social Security and Actuarial Reductions
For the purpose of our simulations, a simplified version of the U.S. Old Age
Insurance (OAl) program is assumed. In the actual system, a worker's benefits are determined by four factors. The first factor is the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). The PIA is a function of the worker's average indexed
monthly earnings in covered employment. Roughly speaking, workers with
higher lifetime earnings tend to have a higher PIA. For these simulations, it is
assumed that all workers have a PIA of $10,000 per year or $833.33 per
month. Recall that the workers are employed under an identical contract,
and all receive the same wage when working. The second factor affecting real
world social security benefits is the recipient's family. Workers with the same
PIA may receive different social security benefits because of differences in
marital status or number of dependents. To simplifY matters, this is left out of
the simulations. All the workers in this model are single with no dependents.
A third factor influencing benefits is the beneficiary's current earnings.
At present, an age 62 beneficiary with annual earnings about a certain
exempt amount has benefits reduced by $1 for each $2 in earnings. These
numbers change with age, and beneficiaries who are age 70 and older are
exempt from the earnings test. For purposes of the simulations, it is assumed that nonemployed workers receive their full social security benefit,
and that employed workers earn too much to receive benefits; all of the
employed workers' benefits are taxed away by the earnings test. Current
earnings can also alter the worker's average indexed monthly earnings, and
thereby both the PIA and the level of benefits. Since our model assumes that
workers receive the same annual wage each year they work, this effect is
ignored here. 1o
Finally, social security benefit levels depend on the age at which the
worker begins receiving benefits. Currently workers obtain benefits equal to
the full PIA if they elect to receive social security at age 65. Workers who
elect to receive social security benefits prior to age 65 receive reduced benefits. By returning to work, however, early retirees can increase their monthly
benefit due to benefit recomputation. Consider, for example, a male who
receives social security benefits for one year following his sixty-second birthday, returns to work, and fully retires at age 65. If his earnings at age 63 and
64 are above the earnings test, then his benefit at age 65 will be 93.4 percent
(100% - 12 months X % ofl %) of the full social security benefit. Another
adjustment is made for people who elect to receive benefits after their 65th
birthday, called the delayed retirement credit.
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Social Security Benefits Are Not Actuarially Neutral for Workers Who Expect to
Work After They Become Beneficiaries

62

63

65

70

75

Present
VaLueo!
Benefits
at Age 62

PersonA
Expects to receive benefits
after age 63 and:
Receives benefits at age 62
Does not receive at age 62

$8,000
$0

$8,000
$8,667

$8,000
$8,667

$8,000
$8,667

$8,000
$8,667

$117,951
$119,114

PersonB
Expects to not receive
benefits from age 63 through
69 and:
Receives benefits at age 62
Does not receive at age 62

$8,000
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$11,433
$12,250

$11,433
$12,250

$97,115
$95,480

AnnuaL SociaL Security Benefit at Selected Ages

Source: Author's calculations.

As a result of these rules, expected work behavior plays a fundamental
role in any assessment of the effect of actuarial adjustments. Alternatively
stated, as a result of these rules, the penalty for receipt of social security
benefits in year j depends crucially on expected work behavior in year j+ 1,
j+2, and so forth. A worker who is laid off at age 62 and receives social
security early retirement benefits pays a penalty in the form oflower future
benefits. If, however, that individual returns to work, this penalty can be
effectively postponed until age 70. And in the present context, because of
discounting and the probability of death, a postponed penalty is a reduced
penalty.
Table 1 illustrates this point; it shows that by returning to work, a worker
can effectively postpone and thereby reduce the penalty associated with
early retirement. At age 62, workers A and B are observationally identical
males with the same social security earnings record and the same benefit
entitlement. Moreover, both experience a layoff on their 62nd birthday, and
both contemplate receipt of social security benefits at age 62. The only
difference between the two is that worker B expects to return to work while
worker A does not. More precisely, regardless of what happens at age 62,
worker A expects not to work and to receive social security benefits from age
63 to death. In contrast, worker B expects to work from age 63 through age
69, and then fully retire on his 70th birthday.
Now, consider the social security benefits received by worker A. If he
initiated receipt at age 62, worker A would receive $8,000 in social security
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benefits in that year and annually for the rest of his life. At a 2 percent real
discount rate and given the survival rates of males born in 1930, the present
value of this stream of benefits is $117,951. However, ifhe postponed receipt
to age 63, due to actuarial adjustments his annual benefit would rise to
$8,667, yielding a present value of$119,114. In other words, by retiring at 62
instead of 63, the worker loses $1,163 (= $119,114 - $117,951). Had he
foregone receipt at age 62, he would have obtained higher expected lifetime social security benefits.
Next, consider the social security benefits received by worker B, who like
worker A would receive $8,000 in social security benefits if he initiates receipt at age 62. Unlike worker A, worker B expects to return to work and not
receive social security benefits from age 63 through 69; in consequence, his
annual social security benefit at age 70 will be $11,433. Ifworker B receives
benefits at age 62, receives no benefits from 63 through 69 and then receives
benefits again from 70 until death, the present value of his benefits at age 62
(computed with the same assumptions applied to worker A) is $97,115. If,
however, worker B decided to not receive benefits at age 62, he would raise
his social security at age 70 to $12,250. This higher benefit at age 70 and zero
benefit at age 62 translates into a present value at age 62 of $95,480. Thus,
worker B gains money by collecting social security benefits at age 62. He
gains $1,635 (= $97,115 - $95,480). In contrast to worker A, had worker B
forgone receipt at age 62, he would have obtained lower expected lifetime
social security benefits.
Note that like worker A, worker B pays a penalty for receiving benefits at
age 62. For both people the penalty takes the form oflower annual benefits.
The key difference between A and B is that B works from age 63 to 70 and
thereby postpones the penalty until age 70. Due to discounting and survival
probabilities, a penalty postponed is a penalty reduced. Thus, it would be
thoroughly rational for worker B to use social security as a form of unemployment insurance. Since he expects to be reemployed, person B increases
his lifetime benefits if he receives social security during his age 62 hiatus
from work. The gains from current receipt are well in excess of the cost of
future penalties from actuarial reductions. l l
It follows that for purposes of the simulations, the cost of actuarial reduction must be evaluated as a function of the worker's expected future employment. That is possible in this model. We can determine the probability of a
high or low realization of e for future periods, and from that derive the
future employment probabilities. This derivation is not, however, a simple
matter. The appendix lays out the details of how the cost of actuarial reductions is programmed into the simulations.
Why does the firm in this paper care about actuarial reductions? After all,
the firm is maximizing profits. If receipt of social security benefits at age 62
implies lower benefits for a worker at age 80, why does the firm care? The
answer is that the firm is maximizing profits subject to a worker's lifetime
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expected utility constraint. If actions taken at age 62 reduce the worker's
expected social security benefits at age 80, then those actions affect the
firm's profit, since the contract will require offsetting private pension payments at age 80. Thus, in this model firms fully internalize the effect of
social security actuarial adjustments when they make their separation decisions. There is no opportunistic behavior by firms.

Other Parameters in the Model
Table 2 presents the parameter values assumed for the first set of simulations. Most of these parameters are explained above, but e, C, and 13 deserve
further discussion. The UI program parameters e and C are set at .7 and
$3,500 respectively. The value for ecomes from Table 10 of Topel (1985).
Since C is an annual benefit, it is computed as the product of $250 (the
approximate average state maximum weekly benefit in 1995) and 14 weeks
(the approximate average weeks of unemployment insurance receipt for UI
recipients over the 1980s and early 1990s) .12
The discount rate, 13, is set at .04. Since this is the discount rate that both
firms and workers use in evaluating the future, one could reasonably argue
that the rate should be set at the level used by firms for purposes of capital
budgeting. When the firms in this paper place older workers into nonemployment, they bear risk. Due to actuarial adjustments in the social security system, they are gambling that future demand shocks (which affect
the worker's future employment) and mortality outcomes are such that the

TABLE

2.

Parameters Used When Calibrating the Model

Variable

Symbol

Assumed Value

Value of e at its high realization
Value of e at its low realization
Consumption value of home production
Unemployment insurance benefit
Social security benefit at age 65
Serial correlation parameter in the error
equation q}H) = (l-ex)uj +exqj_/(H)
Experience rating parameter
Payroll tax rate
Earnings
Fraction of birth cohort surviving to age j
given survived to age 25
Distribution of skills

9 (H)
9 (L)

1.3
.7
$16,000
$3,500
$10,000
0

/(S)

Discount rate for both worker and firm.

13

Source: Author's calculations.

z
c
Vo

ex

e
t
w
Aj

.7
.075
$26,000
Derived from Felicitie
Bell eta!. (1992), Table 6
Uniform from $23,900
to $38,900.
.04
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Figure 1. Percent not employed by age: calibrating the model with two values of the
experience rating parameter. Source: Author's calculations.

money saved by sending the worker home today will not result in losses in
the future. Given that, they would arguably evaluate these decisions using
the discount rate applied to other risky ventures. Surveys of corporate capital budgeting practices find that firms use real annual discount rates that
range from zero to 13 percent (Boudreau 1983: 566).
The simulations are calibrated to yield results for unemployment insurance that are similar to Topel's results on the effects of experience rating. 13
Specifically, the model is calibrated so that raising the experience rating
parameter from .7 to 1.0 (and thereby eliminating the subsidy due to imperfect experience rating) reduces the annual rate of nonemployment from .14
to .10.
Figure 1 illustrates the results of the "benchmark" simulations. 14 This is a
graph of the nonemployed as a percent of the population by age for ten
runs of the simulation model. Each run involves drawing new random variables for the ten firms (each ofwhich employs five workers). Note that in the
absence of social security, the simulations yield roughly the same percentage
of nonemployed people from age 50 to 70. That is as expected, since both
home production (z) and skill (5) are the same for all ages. Note also that at
age 70, all workers become nonemployed. That is because by construction,
skill levels equal zero from age 70 until death.
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Simulation Results
Figures 2-5 introduce a social security program into the calibrated model.
In a program with no actuarial adjustment, Figure 2 shows that early retirees
receive the same annual benefit as late retirees. As expected, the model produces an abrupt jump in nonemployed workers at age 62; the nonemployment rate rises from .14 to .50 for workers age 62 or older. Since social
security is not experience rated, it acts like a particularly generous form of
unemployment insurance. The simulations indicate that this type of unemployment insurance would have dramatic effects on employer behavior.
We introduce actuarial adjustments to social security benefits in Figure 3.
The higher line indicates the effect of imposing an early retirement penalty
of % of 1 percent per month and a delayed retirement credit of % of 1
percent per month. Roughly speaking, this is the contemporary system.
Clearly such adjustments matter at ages 62 and 63, dramatically reducing
nonemployment at these ages. Mter age 65, however, they have little effect
(compare Figure 3 with Figure 2), and despite these adjustments, nonemployment rates from age 62 on are well above those in the absence of
social security (Figure 1).
The lower line in Figure 3 indicates the effect of the benefit adjustment
scheduled to be implemented in the year 2008. Here the normal retirement
age is 66, the annual penalty for early retirement from age 62 to 65 is .0625
percent per year, and the delayed retirement credit is 8 percent per year.
The simulations again indicate that these changes could significantly alter
the level of nonemployment. Indeed, the level of nonemployment at ages
62-65 is almost at the same level as with no program. The simulations imply
major shifts in employer behavior.
Figure 4 presents a simulation of the effect of reducing the payroll tax for
people over 62 from .15 to .10. A lower payroll tax should raise employment
by reducing the propensity for employers to move workers from employment to nonemployment. The higher line indicates the effects of the contemporary system; this is identical to the higher line in Figure 3. The lower
line indicates the effect of the reduced payroll tax. While the reduced tax
succeeds in raising employment at ages 62-65, it also decreases employment at older ages. That decrease is due to actuarial adjustments in the
social security program. An increase in the probability ofwork at ages 62-65
translates into higher social security benefits between ages 66 and 69, which
then reduces the probability of work at these later ages.
The effect of financing social security out of a consumption tax rather
than a payroll tax is shown in Figure 5. Such a tax places a smaller burden on
earned income (payments made when people are working), and a larger
burden on nonearned income like social security benefits, unemployment
insurance benefits, and pensions. In order to raise the same revenues as the
15 percent payroll tax, consumption would have to be taxed at a rate of
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Figure 2. Percent not employed by age: social security with no actuarial adjustment.
Source: Author's calculations.
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approximately 9.2 percent. 15 For purposes of the simulation, that is translated into a tax of 9 percent on all forms of income; thus the consumption
tax reduces the tax on earnings from 15% to 9% and raises the tax on
nonearned income from 0% to 9%. In Figure 5 the higher line once again
represents the 1995 social security system. The lower line represents the
effect of the consumption tax. The change in financing does, indeed, lead
to an increase in employment at all ages.

Conclusion
Previous research shows that firms respond to adverse demand shocks by
laying off the young and encouraging retirement of the old, and the unemployment insurance program influences these employer responses. Our
research has suggested that social security may have a similar effect on
employer efforts at inducing early retirement.
Our simulation model explores the potential magnitude of this social
security effect. The simulations assume that employers make all retirement
decisions, and that their response to social security is similar to their previously documented response to unemployment insurance. The main result
is that social security could well have a significant effect on employer behavior. Moreover, the pattern of results is sensitive to changes in actuarial
adjustments and alternative financing mechanisms.
Interesting policy questions arise if we view social security as a form of
unemployment insurance. In particular, this perspective leads one to question the use of payroll taxes that fall exclusively on earnings. In the implicit
contract model used here, a payroll tax causes the employer to both shift
compensation from earned to nonearned income (e.g., pensions), and to
increase the probability of nonemployment. This effect could be particularly important for older workers, and it may be useful to consider policies
that reduce such incentives.
A consumption tax is one salient alternative to the payroll tax. Since it falls
on all forms of income, a consumption tax (such as a value added tax)
would not cause employers to shift compensation from earned to nonearned income. It follows that one way to increase the employment of older
workers would be to introduce a small consumption tax on the full population, and simultaneously reduce payroll taxes for workers over 62. Revenues
from the consumption tax could be assigned to the social security Trust
Fund and thereby offset losses from the reduced payroll tax. Indeed, the
consumption tax could be set so as to increase total revenues and thereby
address the long run financial problems of the social security system.
The debate within the recent Advisory Council on Social Security provides another way to think about this paper's policy implications. As described in Chapter 1 of this volume, the Council examined three alternative
proposals for keeping the system in long-run actuarial balance while im-

286

Sodal Security and Employer Induced Retirement

proving money's worth ratios for younger cohorts. It is interesting to ask
how viewing the current social security program as a form of unemployment
insurance fits into the debate over these three alternatives.
All three alternatives might be used by workers as a form of old-age unemployment insurance. For example, under the MB alternative, if benefits and
taxes were structured so that the program effectively subsidized early receipt, then firms might seek to use the program as a form of unemployment
insurance. One might argue that this is less likely for the IA and PSA option.
If the individually controlled accounts essentially paid a lump sum benefit
(or an actuarially fair annuity) once a person reached a certain age, thenat least in the above model- these accounts would not affect an employer's
propensity to induce early retirement. However, both options IA and PSA
have components that differ from simple IRA-type accounts (e.g., both provide a minimum benefit to retirees). If such benefits are actuarially unfair
(and that seems quite likely in a minimum benefit program), then the
incentives examined in this paper could persist for some groups of workers.
Thus, under all three alternatives, social security could still be used as a
form of unemployment insurance.
It is possible that by reducing incentives to use social security as a form of
unemployment insurance, the government could both increase work in the
older population and reduce the long-run government budget deficit. Indeed, to the extent that these incentives cause socially inefficient separations, there may exist tax and benefit changes that reduce deadweight losses
and shrink the long run deficit without affecting the well-being of either
workers or retirees. But a complete discussion of optimal changes and resulting effects on the long run deficit requires additional empirical information on how the social security system influences employer behavior. The
simulations presented here suggest that these behavioral effects may be
important.

Appendix
This appendix provides details on how actuarial adjustments were analyzed
in the simulation model. As noted in the text, people who elect to receive
social security benefits before their 65th birthday receive reduced benefits,
while people who elect to receive benefits after their 65th birthday receive a
delayed retirement credit.
For purposes of the simulation, these rules are operationalized as follows.
Let, the annual social security benefit for an individual age A who has
worked Nyears after his 62nd birthday be written as G(A, N), where both A
and Nare integers. Thus, people who take "normal" retirement at age 65
after working all three years between age 62 and 65 have an annual social security benefit of G(65,3). Given this, for all 62:5A:570 and 0:5N:5A-62, let
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G(A,N) = f3G(65,3)

where
f3 = (1 + .06666*(N- 3» if N:5: 3,
f3

=

(l

+ .04500* (N-3) ) if N> 3.

Thus, people who begin receiving social security retirement benefits at age
62 receive a benefit equal to 80 percent of their age 65 "normal retirement"
benefit (G(62,0) = .8G(65,3)). If they work one year between their 62nd and
65th birthdays (with earnings such that they get zero benefits due to the
retirement test), their benefit at age 65 is G(65,1) = .866*G(65,3). Alternatively, if they work four years between their 62nd and 68th birthdays, their
benefit at age 68 is G(68,4) = 1.045*G(65,3). A minor complication in this is
that if a worker begins receipt at age 62 (say) and then works prior to age 65,
benefits are not recalculated until age 65. This too was incorporated into the
simulations.
When firms in these simulations decide whether to employ a worker who
is age 62 or older, their calculations must include an assessment of expected
social security benefits. Employment in the current period not only means
forgone social security benefits in the current period, but also higher social
security benefits in the future. For purposes of these simulations it is necessary to develop an algorithm for calculating the present value of those
future benefits.
Since the workers in this model are no longer employed after their 70th
birthday, it is straightforward to compute the present value of social security
benefits after that point in time. Consider a worker who, at the time of his
70th birthday, has worked N(70) of the eight years between his 62nd and
70th birthday, where N(70) is an integer between 0 and 8. From that day
forward the worker receives a social security benefit of G{70,N(70)}. Let
B{70, N (70)} denote the present value of those benefits:
110

(A.I)

B {70, N(70)}

=

2: (l/(l+r»i-70(V00)G{70,N(70)}
i=70

where
l; is the fraction of the birth cohort surviving to exact age i, ljl70 is the
probability of surviving to age i given survival to age 70, and r is the rate at
which the firm discounts future costs and benefits.

Now, consider a worker who just celebrated his 69th birthday, having
worked N(69) years since turning 62, where N(69) is an integer between 0
and 7. If he is employed over the next year (and does not, in consequence,
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receive social security benefits) the present value of his social security benefits is
((I70/l69)/(1

+ r»*Bj7D, N(69)+11.

If he is not employed over the next year (and consequently receives social
security benefits) the present value of his social security benefits is
G{69,N(69) 1+ «l70/ l69)/ (1 +r»* B (7D, N(69) I.

Of course, in deciding whether to employ the worker, the firm must take
into account this difference in the expected present value of soCial security
benefits. The firm's decision rule on the 69th birthday (after 6 is revealed)
would be to employ the worker if his value of marginal product exceeds the
value of his externally financed consumption, where the value of externally
financed consumption is,
(A.2)

z + G 169,N(69) 1- ((170/ l69) / (1+r» *(B {7D, N(69)+ 11- B {7D, N(69)})

The final term in this sum is the expected present value of additional social security benefits that result from an additional year of work at age
69 and N( 69). This is subtracted from the age 69 social security benefit
(Gl69,N(69) I) because the worker essentially forgoes these additional benefits ifhe does not work at age 69.
At this point it is useful to compute B{69,N(69)}, the expected present
value of social security benefits at age 69 and N(69) before 6 is revealed. To
do this, one must determine the probability that the worker is employed at
age 69 and N( 69). But this isjust the probability that Sll (69) exceeds the sum
in (A.2). Let P(6(69» represent that probability. Since 6(69) = 6(H) if
q6g(H) ~.5 and 6(L) with if q6g(H) <.5, and the distribution of qis generated
from a uniform distribution, that probability can be computed. Then
B{69, N(69)} = P(Il(69» ((I70/l69)/(1H»BI7D, N(69)+11

- (1-P(Il(69» (G{69,N(69)+ ((l70/ l69)/ (1 +r) )BI7D, N(69»)).

Now, consider a worker who just celebrated his 68th birthday, having
worked N(68) years since turning 62, where N(68) is an integer between 0
and 6. If he is employed over the next year (and does not, in consequence,
receive social security benefits) the present value of his social security benefits is
((l69/ l68)/ (1+r»

* B{69, N(68) +I}.

If he is not employed over the next year (and consequently receives social
security benefits) the present value of his social security benefits is
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+ «l69/l68)/(1+r»*BI69, N(68)}.

The firm's decision rule on the 68th birthday (after e is revealed) would be
to employ the worker if his value of marginal product exceeds the value of
his externally financed consumption, where the value of externally financed
consumption is
(A.3)

z + G{68,N(68») - «lfi9/ l6B)/ (1 +r»

*(B{69, N(68) +1}- B{69, N(68)}).

This is obviously similar to (A.2). One can then follow the above algorithm to compute B168,N (68), ... , BI62,OI.
Given an individual who is age Ao with years of work No, the simulation
program first computes BI70,N(70) I for all feasible values of N(70). Given
that it computes BI69,N(69) I for all feasible values of N(69), and so forth
back to BlAo,Nol. The worker is then employed if his value of marginal
product exceeds z + GlAo, Nol - «lAo+1/lAo)/(1+r»*(B1Ao+l, N(Ao)+ll BlAo+l, N(Ao)l)·
The author wishes to thank without implicating Gary Fields, Michael
Leonesio, Olivia Mitchell, and Steven Sandell for helpful comments and
discussions about this chapter.
Notes
1. See for example, Feldstein (1976) and Topel (1983, 1984, 1985).
2. This model has antecedents in Feldstein (1976), Topel (1984), Wright and
Hotchkiss (1988), and Burdett and Wright (1989), and is related to the models in
Hutchens (1995, 1996).
3. Assume that and D' > 0 and U" < 0.
4. No constraints are placed on the range ofwages or pensions, thereby permitting
contracts where workers make payments to firms.
5. The Lagrangian for this problem is
L= n + Jo[A.{ED - ED*}

+ {u(6) (1 - P(6» + J3(6)P(6)}]f(6)d6

where A, «(6), and 13(6) are Lagrange multipliers with P(6) < 1 implying u(6)
and p(6) > implying 13(6) = O. The resulting first order conditions are

°

Lw(o) =

Lb(o)

Lp(s) =

=

0

-(1+t)P(6) +A(1-t)U'(w(6)(1-t»P(6) =0,

= - (1-P(6» + AU' (b(6)+c+z)(1-P(6» = 0,

6- w(6) (1 +t) +b(6)+ec+ A[U( w(6) (1- t» - U( b(6) +c+z)] - u (6) + 13 (6)

=

O.

These equations must be satisfied for each 6. A similar problem is analyzed in
Hutchens (1995).
6. More rigorously, an expansion of the first order condition for the employment
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probability around the point t = 0 yields the following modification of the employment rule in equation 4:
If 6;:.:::z+ (I-e) c+ 2w*dt then r(6) = 1,

If6<z+ (l-e)c+ 2w*dtthen P''''(6)

=O.

Thus, an increase in the payroll tax (dt>O) results in a lower employment
probability.
7. Of course, these ideas do not apply to all jobs. Implicit contracts are most likely
to arise in situations where a firm and its workers are engaged in repeated interactions over a long period of time, and, in consequence, an implicit contract model
of layoffs (or retirements) can only apply to a subset of jobs. Also, the model
assumes that employers make all separation decisions, ignoring the reality of
employee-initiated separations. Future research should integrate the complex reality of employer-initiated and employee-initiated retirements into a single framework.
8. There is no guarantee that these taxes yielc;l a balanced budget. Any shortfall is
made up through a head tax that is assessed when the cohort is born.
9. Of course, age 70 is arbitrary; alternatives would be age 80 or 90. The more
interesting and realistic case of gradually diminishing skill is beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
10. Recomputation involves nominal earnings (as opposed to indexed earning)
after age 60. Thus, the effect of recomputation is complicated. At least one source
argues that this effect is in reality usually small. See Steuerle and Bakija (I994: 218).
11. See Rust (1990: 374) for a similar analysis.
12. Note also that a equals zero in the table. Since q/H) is the probability of a high
realization of e, and q/L) is the probability of a low realization, where q/L) = I qj(H), let q/H) = (I-a) uj + a qj-l (H), where uj is a uniformly distributed error on
the unit interval, and OS::aS::1. This specification permits simulations \'lith serially
correlated demand shocks. If a = 0, qj(H) is simply a uniformly distributed error
term that is independent across periods. If, however, a is greater than zero, q/H) is a
uniformly distributed error term that exhibits serial correlation. That is useful; it
allows one to simulate the effect of demand shocks that influence behavior over
more than one period. Since a = 0 in all simulations, sensitivity to serial correlation is
not explored here.
13. Using CPS data from 1977-81, Topel (1985) finds that elimination of the
subsidy due to imperfect experience rating would reduce the monthly unemployment rate from .0516 to .0376. Since the annual rate of unemployment in the March
1978 Current Population Survey was .158, and since the average monthly rate in
1978 was .060, for purposes of the simulation I multiply these numbers by 2.63 =
15.8/6.0. Leon and Rones (1980), Table 1 indicate that the average monthly unemployment rate in 1978 was 6.0. Young (1980), Table 5 indicates that the incidence of
unemployment in calendar 1978 was 15.8.
14. Since all workers are born on the same day and have the same expected skill
level, the simulations proceed as follows.
1. Just before the workers' 25th birthday, the firm enters into identical lifetime
contracts with five workers. Once the ink is dry on the contracts, skill level is revealed. As indicated in Table 2, this is operationalized by drawing five random numbers from a uniform distribution with a lower bound of$23,900 and an upper bound
of$38,900.
2. Each year the firm draws an error term from a uniform distribution. As discussed above, the distribution of the error is of the form, qj(H) = (I-a) uj +
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a.qj_1 (H), where ttj is a uniformly distributed error on the unit interval, and 0$a.:S1.
If qiH) >.5 then ej = e(H). Otherwise ej = e(L).
3. Letting Si' i = 1,5 denote the skill level of the five workers, the firm employs a
worker if the value of the worker's marginal product (S ej ) exceeds the worker's
"externally financed consumption" when not employed (vj + (1- e) c+ z,.+ 2wl'.t).
4. Workers who are not employed receive unemployment insurance if under age
62, social security benefits if over 62, and private payments. Note that workers who
receive social security benefits do not receive unemployment insurance benefits.
15. Payroll tax collections for OASDHI in 1994 were $446.3 billion, and personal
outlays (disposable income minus savings) were $4,826.5 billion. To raise $446.3
billion, a consumption tax would have to tax personal outlays at a rate of 446.3/
4,826.5 = .092.
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